Will High-Frequency Trading Practices Transform the Financial Markets in the Asia Pacific Region? by KAUFFMAN, Robert John et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
6-2015
Will High-Frequency Trading Practices Transform
the Financial Markets in the Asia Pacific Region?
Robert John KAUFFMAN
Singapore Management University, rkauffman@smu.edu.sg
Yuzhou HU
Singapore Management University
Dan MA
Singapore Management University, madan@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-015-0003-8
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and
the Technology and Innovation Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
KAUFFMAN, Robert John; HU, Yuzhou; and MA, Dan. Will High-Frequency Trading Practices Transform the Financial Markets in
the Asia Pacific Region?. (2015). Financial Innovation. 1, 1-27. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2708
RESEARCH Open Access
Will high-frequency trading practices
transform the financial markets in the Asia
Pacific Region?
Robert J. Kauffman*, Yuzhou Hu and Dan Ma
* Correspondence:
rkauffman@smu.ed.sg
School of Information Systems,
Singapore Management University,
80 Stamford Road, Singapore
198702, Singapore
Abstract
High-frequency trading (HFT) practices in the global financial markets involve the use
of information and communication technologies (ICT), especially the capabilities of
high-speed networks, rapid computation, and algorithmic detection of changing
information and prices that create opportunities for computers to effect low-latency
trades that can be accomplished in milliseconds. HFT practices exist because a
variety of new technologies have made them possible, and because financial market
infrastructure capabilities have also been changing so rapidly. The U.S. markets, such
as the National Association for Securities Dealers Automated Quote (NASDAQ)
market and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), have maintained relevance and
centrality in financial intermediation in financial markets settings that have changed so
much in the past 20 years that they are hardly recognizable. In this article, we explore
the technological, institutional and market developments in leading financial markets
around the world that have embraced HFT trading. From these examples, we will distill
a number of common characteristics that seem to be in operation, and then assess the
extent to which HFT practices have begun to be observed in Asian regional financial
markets, and what will be their likely impacts. We also discuss a number of theoretical
and empirical research directions of interest.
Keywords: Asian region; Equity markets; Financial innovation; Financial IS and
technology; Financial markets; High-frequency trading (HFT); Market transformation;
Technological innovation
Since the mid-2000s, the average trade size in the U.S. stock market had
plummeted, the markets had fragmented, and the gap in time between the public
view of the markets and the view of high-frequency traders had widened. The rise
of high-frequency trading had been accompanied also by a rise in stock market
volatility—over and above the turmoil caused by the 2008 financial crisis. The
price volatility within each trading day in the U.S. stock market between 2010
and 2013 was nearly 40 % higher than the volatility between 2004 and 2006, for
instance. There were days in 2011 in which volatility was higher than in the most
volatile days of the dot-com bubble.
Author Michael Lewis ((2014), p. 59) in The Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt
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The SEC should not roll back the technology clock or prohibit algorithmic trading, but
we are assessing the extent to which specific elements of the computer-driven trading
environment may be working against investors rather than for them. An area of
particular focus is the use of aggressive, destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable
market conditions, when they could most seriously exacerbate price volatility.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo White, June 2014, quoted
by Shorter and Miller (2014)
Introduction
Over hundreds of years around the world, securities were traded through physical venues
where buyers and sellers met and negotiated the exchange of ownership of securities and as-
sets. An example in the history of American financial markets is the “Buttonwood Agree-
ment” of May 1792, involving 24 stockbrokers in New York (Terrell 2012). The group
established an early basis for the New York Stock Exchange by agreeing to trade with one
another and no others, and to set a minimum commission for share trading. They initially
met under an American sycamore tree – the so-called “buttonwood tree,” at 68 Wall Street
in lower Manhattan. This approach to making trades later moved to purpose-build financial
exchange facilities and trading floors, where traders wore brightly-colored jackets, shouted
out their bid and ask prices to buy and sell shares, and made themselves stand out from the
crowd in the open outcry marketplace.
Transformation in the Financial Services Industry via Information Technology
With the recent developments and innovations in information technology (IT), the financial
services sector has been transformed over several decades (Steiner & Teixeira 1989; Wriston
1988, 2007). In the 1800s, the use of the telegraph to connect American cities and the
Atlantic Cable to connect New York and London created the first instances when it was
possible to exploit financial market-related informational advantage for trading in the U.S.
regional and U.K. national markets (Kavesh et al. 1978). Starting in the 1970s, the trading
process became computerized, and manual trading processes were targeted for elimination.
Then, in the 1980s, program trading emerged and trades were sent to market based on
computer software and algorithms (Hasbrouck et al. 1993). By the end of 1990s, the emer-
gence of electronic communication networks (ECNs) further changed trading on the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quote (NASDAQ) and New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) (Stoll 2006). This made it possible to extend daytime trading into
overnight crossing market operations. In 1998, with the passage of the Regulation on Alter-
native Trading Systems (Regulation ATS) (Securities and Exchange Commission 1998),
ECNs became more popular. Some brokerages set up new ECNs, which in turn led to more
use of algorithmic trading (Aldridge 2013).
High-frequency trading (HFT), also called algorithmic trading, is an imprecise term
that currently has no legal or regulatory definition. (See Appendix: Table 3 for a listing
of all of the technical terms in this article, along with their definitions.) It is used to de-
scribe a subset of algorithmic trading activities largely associated with the sell side of
the financial industry. Algorithmic trading is the use of computer algorithms to automatic-
ally make trading decisions, submit securities trades, and manage securities orders after their
submission (Investopedia 2015). A 2010 (Securities and Exchange Commission 2010, p. 45)
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report on market structure offers a detailed description of HFT practices, which involve: “(1)
the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated computer programs for generating,
routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-location services and individual data feeds offered
by exchanges and others to minimize network and other types of latencies; (3) very short time-
frames for establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the submission of numerous orders that
are canceled shortly after their submission; and (5) ending the trading day in as close to a flat
position as possible (… not carrying significant, unhedged positions overnight).” It is typical
that high-frequency traders end their trading day by squaring up their positions, so they are
neither long nor short. They do this to reflect the fact that they trade on information
moment to moment, rather than with longer-term strategies from day to day. Numerous
authors have recognized the potential for controversy, problems, and legal issues (McGowan
2010).
The securities trading landscape in the presence of HFT practices is characterized by
more intense competition for order flows, faster connections between buy and sell-side
firms and the exchanges, cooperation between high-frequency traders and exchanges, the
emergence of a rich ecosystem of technology providers, and the promulgation of regula-
tions that ensure HFT does not damage market quality. Like other settings where new
and advanced technologies are used, HFT technologies enable their adopters to gain legit-
imate returns on investment (ROI) from their investments, as well as compensation for
their market, counterparty and operational risk exposures. The adopters of HFT practices
compete to connect their trading capabilities for the financial markets as fast as possible,
so they can be faster than the competition. For the market venues, they compete to attract
orders and liquidity providers. Many exchanges now provide beneficial services to high-
frequency traders, such as direct connections to exchange data and co-location services.
Typical HFT traders include mutual and pension funds, and other sophisticated
investors. Innovative HFT practices first appeared in U.S. financial markets, and then
expanded to Europe and Asia. The Tabb Forum (2014) reported that HFT activities
accounted for 49 % of the trading volume in the American equity markets in 2013.
HFT accounted for about 40 % of all equity trades in the European market in 2009,
according to a European Parliament report (Swinburne 2010). More recently, HFT
practices have been diffusing into the markets in other countries, as the technology
capabilities of western countries have extended their influence worldwide. For example,
HFT practices have now penetrated all of the major financial markets in the Asia
Pacific region although HFT accounted for only about 12 % of total trading by value on
the regional stock exchanges in 2011, excluding Japan and Australia, according to
research by Schroders reported in Price (2013)2.
Toward Understanding Issues with HFT Practices in Global Markets
With this background in mind, we ask a number of questions. How have HFT practices
been transforming the financial markets in the Asia Pacific region? To what extent have
these practices penetrated market exchange of equities, and what issues have arisen
around these changes? Have the changes been different for different countries and na-
tional markets? What research questions are worthwhile exploring in this context, and
what policy issues will need to be addressed? This article offers an overview of HFT
practices in different markets around the world, with specific interest in the financial
markets in the Asia Pacific region.
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Though HFT has been gaining global popularity, it still faces a unique set of chal-
lenges that raise questions about regulations. The Flash Crash of May 6, 2010 sent a
wake-up call to investors and regulators. HFT practices have been criticized for skim-
ming profits at the expense of ordinary investors, and manipulating the market (Biais &
Woolley 2011). In contrast, some experts have argued that these trades play an import-
ant role in the market by providing both liquidity and price discovery while lowering
transaction costs. As a result, there has been debate around the issue that regulations
on high-frequency traders should be cautiously evaluated, so that the market is not fro-
zen and trading is not driven away. Nevertheless, numerous investigations have been
initiated to assess the impact of HFT practices on market quality (Brogaard et al. 2014,
Hendershott et al. 2011, Jarrow & Protter 2012), and all of the major financial markets
have established their own regulations related to HFT. As the debate over HFT has
grown, observers have wondered how trading technology will evolve in next decade,
whether high-frequency trading will become even more widely dominant, and how it
will be regulated.
This article is laid out in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of HFT
activities in the American and European financial markets, while Section 3 examines
them in the regional financial markets of the Asia Pacific area. Section 4 considers
competition, cooperation, and regulation in these markets. Section 5 proposes new re-
search directions, and Section 6 concludes.
The rise of high-frequency trading
We next will discuss securities-related technology evolution, and the rise of HFT in the
American and European markets, where technological innovation resulted in new prac-
tices, issues, and regulatory solutions.
Background: Technology Evolution for HFT Practices
Ever since its debut in the financial markets in the early 2000s, HFT has gained popu-
larity and usage at an astonishing speed, transforming the securities trading mecha-
nisms of all the financial markets around the world. Traditional floor-based trading is
being gradually phased-out, as more and more investors have chosen to work with
firms that employ algorithmic trading approaches.
In fact, securities trading mechanisms have been in a continuous state of evolution
since 1602, when the Amsterdam Stock Exchange was launched as the world’s first
stock exchange (Petram 2011). In the beginning, the volume of securities traded and
the number of traders involved in various marketplaces was always very small, but they
grew in Amsterdam and elsewhere over time. In the 1960s, financial information still
spread rather slowly, typically through ticker tapes, and phone-based communication
was expensive (Brummer 2008). Trading was almost always a manual process.
Once the exchanges started to implement computerized communications, securities
trading could be conducted much faster. This permitted traders to be connected to a
trading platform rather than to be physically present on trading floors. In 1971, NAS-
DAQ (2015) became the world’s first electronic stock market, by introducing an elec-
tronic price and quantity quotation system for competing market-makers to trade
securities. A few years later in 1976, the NYSE introduced the “designated order turn-
around” (DOT) system, which supported electronic transmission of orders to buy and
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sell securities (Keith & Grody 1988). Floor-based trading mostly ended in the 1980s,
and program and electronic trading became more popular since then (Hasbrouck et al.
1993). Program trading is defined as buying or selling fifteen or more stocks with total
value over USD 1 million dollars, and was mostly used for trading in the S&P 500 equi-
ties and futures markets (Tagliani 2009).
With the emergence of ECNs in the 1990s, investors began to be able to trade outside
traditional exchanges and beyond the normal exchange trading-hours. ECNs match buy
and sell orders automatically and connect individual investors with large brokerages directly,
so they can trade with each other without going through a middleman (Weston 2002).
Compared with other trading channels, ECNs have been able to reduce costs and trading
errors, enhance operational efficiency, and provide benefits for overnight risk management.
Just a few years later, algorithmic trading and HFT became prevalent in securities trad-
ing. And today, HFT practices dominate the majority of trading activities in U.S. securities.
The markets in the U.S. employ extremely fast trading facilities and sophisticated com-
puter programs. Orders are generated, routed and executed automatically and quickly,
with hundreds of trades being completed within milliseconds (United States Commodity
and Futures Trading Commission 2012). There are several reasons that account for the rise
of HFT practices. One is the development of new technologies that have made high-speed
program trading possible, with lower and lower costs for the implementation of such trad-
ing systems over time (Mehta 2009). The other reason is that the major exchanges, includ-
ing NASDAQ, the Better Alternative Trading System (BATS) market, and the NYSE, have
responded to the demand from traders by offering faster access to their trading infrastruc-
tures and direct connections to their trade data transmissions (Sorkin 2014).
There are other reasons as well. The SEC adopted decimalized prices in 2000. This deci-
sion directed stock exchanges to quote share prices in decimal form instead of using the
traditional fractions, which supported wider spreads (Securities and Exchange Commission
2012). This made traditional market-making less profitable, reduced the size of securities
trades, and enhanced the demand for more sophisticated computerized trading. After 1998,
when more ECNs were registered and set up by brokerage firms, the number of trading
venues that supported algorithmic trading further increased. Then, during the years leading
up to the mid-2000s, the SEC sought to ensure that all of the existing domestic exchanges
were linked together, so their prices would be more easily accessed to support more efficient
market trading. This resulted in the SEC’s 2005 promulgation of the Regulation National
Market System (NMS) (Bunge 2014, Securities and Exchange Commission 2005), which
enabled the current trading mechanisms.
HFT practices have spread around the world in a short time. The U.S. and European
financial markets have experienced many changes as a result of this, including the imple-
mentation of sophisticated trading technologies all the way to changes in their regulatory
frameworks for securities trading. Figure 1 presents data on HFT growth from 2005 to 2014
for the U.S. and European Union as a percentage of the total turnover for equity trading.
In 2005 in the U.S., HFT was estimated to be about 21 % of all trades by volume,
while in Europe it had hardly begun, and so was close to 1 % by value (Credit Suisse
2014). From 2006 to 2009, the growth of HFT was rapid. It accounted for 61 % by vol-
ume of the entire equity turnover in the U.S. in 2009, up from 52 % in 2008. Similarly,
in Europe, HFT as a percentage of total equity turnover by value also grew rapidly to
around 29 % in 2009, up from 21 % just a year earlier in 2008.
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The rate of growth of HFT continued in the European Union for another year, reaching
38 % of equity turnover value in 2010 and 2011. But HFT began to decline in the U.S. in
the same period. In 2010 and 2011, it fell to 54 % to 56 %, respectively, of the total
volume, and then stabilized at close to 50 % in 2012, 2013 and 2014. European HFT also
fell back to about 35 % in 2012, and then went below 30 % in 2013 and 2014. So there
does not appear to be upward movement in HFT growth going forward (Phillips 2013,
Popper 2012b).
The spread of HFT practices in the Asia-Pacific region
In contrast to the U.S. and the European Community, HFT activities in the Asia Pacific
region account for only 12 % of total trading by value in stocks on exchanges, excluding
Japan and Australia, as we noted earlier. The financial markets in the Asia Pacific re-
gion are more diversified than those in Europe and America, and have had more mixed
responses to HFT. See Table 1 for an overview of HFT activities in this region. Only
Japan and Australia have embraced the new algorithmic trading approaches, with HFT
penetration rates of 45 % (Grant 2011) and 27 % (Australian Securities and Investments
Commission 2013, Kingsley et al. 2013), respectively.
Most of the major Asia Pacific financial markets are going through fundamental
changes too. For example, Jaswal (2010) has reported that the financial markets in this
region have been moving towards greater efficiency through employing more HFT
methods in the markets they serve. And CapGemini has suggested that proprietary
firms will play a large role in developing HFT in the region (Agarwal 2012). We next
will discuss the major Asia Pacific markets in greater detail. See Appendix: Table 4 for
an overview of the related HFT adoption accelerators and decelerators.
Table 1 Proportion of HFT Activities in the Asia Pacific Region
Country Estimate Information Source
Japan 45 % of equity trading Bank of Japan
Australia 27 % of equity trading Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Hong Kong 20 % of equity trading Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission
Singapore ~30 % in derivatives, ~0 % in equities Singapore Stock Exchange
Fig. 1 Percentage of HFT Equity Turnover, 2005-2014, Relative to All Market Activity
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Japan
Tokyo has been the leading venue for HFT in the Asia Pacific region, and it is estimated
that HFT accounts for 45 % of the equities trading volume there (Grant 2011). The Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE) has made upgrades to its trading systems in an attempt to encourage
an increase in HFT, and the regulations and financial market structure are also favorable for
HFTgrowth (Fujitsu 2010, Wang 2010, World Federation of Exchanges 2013). For example,
in January 2010, to enhance its competitiveness in HFT, the TSE launched the Arrowhead
trading platform to improve its trading speed and security (Bershova & Rakhlin 2013). After
its introduction, order response time decreased to ten milliseconds, although TSE officials
claimed that they favored stability over speed in the Arrowhead’s platform’s design (Yoon
2010). In addition, the level of HFT activities is sensitive to trading fees in the markets, and
the TSE in Japan is fortunate to have relatively low transaction costs. In fact, in 2010, Japan
and Sweden shared the world’s lowest-cost trading value crown, with an average cost of only
18.34 basis points (Byrne 2010).
The broader Japanese market is fragmented enough so that HFT participants are able
to explore price inefficiencies for stocks across the different domestic exchanges. Among
the various exchanges in Japan, the TSE ranks first in trading volume and trading value,
with 90 % of the common stock (or cash equities) volume in Japan occurring there. The
other 10 % of trades are made via private trading systems, such as Chi-X Japan and SBI
JapanNext. In 2013, the TSE merged with the Osaka Security Exchange (OSE) to form the
Japan Exchange Group (JPX), indicating the willingness of domestic exchanges there to
work together to combat competition from abroad (Ito 2013).
In financial markets, a lower tick size, which is the minimum unit for the movement of
the price of a financial instrument, creates opportunities for identifying arbitrage oppor-
tunities (Chordia et al. 2013, Menkveld 2013). This is an essential factor for implementing
HFT trading strategies that will create business value (Chlistalla 2011, Comerton-Forde
2012). JPX has embarked on a three-phase move to reduce its tick size, bringing it into
line with the tighter increments that exist on Japanese proprietary trading systems, Chi-X
Japan and SBI JapanNext (Umeno and Matsubara 2014). In the first phase, JPX initially
implemented one-half Japanese yen (JPY) price ticks for TOPIX 100 companies with JPY
3,000 to JPY 5,000 share prices. The tick size was moved up to one yen in the second
phase, which began in July 2014 (Takeo & Hasegawa 2014). In the third phase, which is
scheduled to begin in mid-2015, JPX will re-examine the appropriateness of the present
tick size based on its impact on trading conditions and execution costs.
Australia
Australia’s HFT activities in its financial market have been limited to date. There are
globally-recognized HFT traders that are participating in the Australia markets, includ-
ing Getco and Virtu Financial (Comerton-Forde 2012). These traders execute their
deals in the two largest exchanges, Chi-X Australia and the Australia Securities
Exchange (ASX). There are also other HFT traders that conduct their trading activities
outside these two exchanges. These firms route their orders to alternative trading
venues, such as dark pools, where it is not possible to acquire public information to
directly gauge the extent of their trading activities. As a result, even the regulators in
Australia have difficulty to obtain a full understanding of the overall extent of HFT
activities in the nation’s financial market.
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We noted earlier that HFT trades represented 27 % of Australian trading volume in
2012. The Australian financial markets exhibit a number of favorable characteristics for
HFT growth, such as the low latency in network communications and low transaction
costs. There are only three trading venues in Australia: ASX TradeMatch, ASX Pure-
Match and Chi-X. In comparison, the U.S. has thirteen exchanges and over fifty alter-
native trading systems. Thus, the Australian markets are less fragmented, so there may
not be the same potential for growth in HFT activity in Australia that the U.S. offered.
Competition between trading venues also pressures the exchanges to upgrade their
trading facilities, as well as to provide services and cut stamp duties for changing secur-
ities ownership. For example, ASX recently upgraded its trading technology and
launched its own low latency platform, PureMatch, to compete directly with Chi-X
(Comerton-Forde 2012). In addition, ASX enhanced its co-location facilities, but it no
longer offers transaction rebates for large participants or large volumes (Australian
Securities Exchange 2010). Competition among exchanges has also brought with it
lower trading fees. This is demonstrated by ASX’s reduction of its trading fees from
0.28 basis points (bps) down to 0.15 bps. Meanwhile, Chi-X also launched a maker-
taker pricing model (Mishkin 2011). This has resulted in differential fees being charged
to trading firms depending on whether they provide or demand liquidity. These
changes make Australia a more attractive place for HFT traders to operate.
Singapore
The Singapore Exchange (SGX) is the largest financial market in Southeast Asia. It has
suffered from decreasing securities trading activities in the past few years though. Ac-
cording to data from SGX, in 2013 there was a 36 % plunge in the daily average value
of equity trades compared to the level of trading that occurred in 2007 (Burgos 2013).
SGX’s net income was SGD 336 million in the fiscal year ending in June 2013, 20 %
lower than in 2007. To boost trading volume in the equities and derivatives market, the
exchange wanted to lure more HFT traders to SGX. To achieve this goal, SGX initiated
a series of technology improvements. For example, in 2013, it launched a new and
ultra-fast trading engine called “SGX Reach,” in a bid to attract HFT traders. This rep-
resented part of a SGD 250 million investment for technology improvements, aimed to
boost trading speed and international connectivity (Malakian 2011).
The Singapore Exchange also has started to offer co-location services to its clients. As of
2011, it had about 100 clients that house their computers for trading nearby the SGX’s
servers. Co-location supports faster trading by cutting the latency of reaction times. The
Malaysian bank, Commerce International Merchant Bankers Berhad (CIMB), was the first
broker-dealer to place its online trading platform at SGX’s co-location center, allowing retail
investors to achieve trades in 100 microseconds (The Trading Mesh 2011a).
Even with all of the above-mentioned initiatives, the SGX has not been successful in
attracting orders from HFT traders yet though. Two factors seem to explain this out-
come. First, high trading costs keep HFT firms away from SGX. Fees for trading on the
Singapore Exchange amount to about 20 bps of the value of shares traded, compared
with Sydney-based ASX’s 15 bps (Burgos 2013). Also, Singapore does not have a frag-
mented financial market like the U.S. does: Singapore is too small a country, and has
just one stock exchange. Thus, there is no arbitrage opportunity existing among differ-
ent trading venues for equities. The only arbitrage opportunities that exist are mainly
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in the derivatives market, where about 30 % of the total volume of trades is attributable
to high-frequency traders. With derivatives contracts, traders can exploit inefficiencies
involving parallel products that trade elsewhere in the world.
Along with these changes, Burgos (2013) also reported that the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS), in its role as the regulator of securities trading under the nation’s
Securities and Futures Act (SFA), has encouraged the SGX to create new market safe-
guards for problems that may arise related to HFT trading in advance of seeking to ex-
pand such trading. The changes to be implemented include circuit breakers to stop
trading when a given equity experiences high intraday price volatility, as well as risk controls
that are put into play during the pre-trade phase. An innovative approach that SGX has
undertaken involves the application of the algorithm that establishes the single prices at
which buy and sell market orders are matched in the opening and closing routines for trad-
ing in the beginning and end of the day with the randomization of application time
(Singapore Exchange 2012). This is to avoid the rigging of order submissions in anticipation
of the end of the time period when price matches are made final.
Hong Kong
Over the years, Hong Kong has been recognized as one of the pre-eminent Asian financial
centers. In comparison to the Japanese financial markets, where HFT traders have been en-
gaged in an arms race for high-technology trading, Hong Kong’s regulators have been hesi-
tant to permit the adoption of the same type of competition that drives trading by the
millisecond.
According to a 2013 report of the regulatory organization, the Hong Kong Securities
and Futures Commission (SFC), approximately 20 % of trading volume was represented
by HFT activities in 2012 (Kingsley et al. 2013). The financial market environment in
Hong Kong is not that favorable for the growth of HFT practices. Similar to some other
countries, the high stamp duty for ownership transfer of securities creates the greatest
push-back against HFT in Hong Kong’s equity market. The SFC levies taxes of 0.1 %
on the purchase and sale of shares, which makes HFT strategies unprofitable (Gov.HK
2013). Many HFT firms that came to Hong Kong in hopes of making money actually
failed and were forced to leave. An example is the U.S.-based HFT trader, Getco, which
closed its Hong Kong office in March 2013 (Bunge 2013).
By the same token, the Hong Kong financial market does not suffer from fragmenta-
tion. The Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEx) organization enjoys a near-
monopoly in share trading, due to local rules stipulating that all trades must be re-
ported to the exchange. Similar to Singapore and other markets in different parts of the
world, Hong Kong can grow the extent to which derivatives are traded using HFT ap-
proaches, but significant investments in technology will need to be made in order to
improve the country’s competitive ability to serve traders in the global markets.
China
China is another country that has not been attractive for HFT practices to diffuse its
internal markets. There are barriers to the wide application of HFT in the country’s
financial markets. First, the regulatory environment for HFT practices in China are not
favorable, and the network communication latency levels in Chinese exchanges are not
conducive to fast trading (Grant 2012). Second, equity trading is subject to the T + 1
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regulation, which forbids the selling of stocks in the same day when it was bought. Fu-
tures traders, in contrast, can deal in the same instrument up to 500 times each day,
but even this limit is still too small in comparison to what HFT traders typically do. So
this T + 1 regulation puts a major constraint on HFT execution. Third, the technologies
that are in use in China’s futures markets are still below the technology required by
most HFT traders, who usually have high requirements for streaming data on equities
and derivatives prices, and demand millisecond updates.
Fourth, the cost of trading in China is relatively high, with stamp duties fluctuating
between 0.1 % and 0.3 % for the sellers of securities. And finally, China’s regulations
with respect to high-frequency trading have not yet been liberalized to promote the
growth of these practices. The case of trading errors and losses at state-owned Ever-
bright Securities in 2013 demonstrated the vulnerabilities that may arise when HFT
practices are used (Miller & Wildau 2013, Sun 2013). This effectively prohibits any
significant development of HFT activities in this market.
In the future, HFT will gain the opportunity to develop further in China only as more
assets come to market, and as trading restrictions and costs diminish. The introduction
of low-latency technologies for traders and exchanges may support the growth in the
proportion of HFT for equities relative to the country’s total trading volume.
To sum up, we note that changes are gradually occurring at the market structure-level
throughout the major Asia Pacific financial markets. As firms have sought new opportun-
ities with HFT practices across the globe, a few obstacles have become apparent though, ac-
cording to industry advisor, the Aite Group (2011). The firm suggests that these obstacles
include: the potential for political and regulatory instability; the lack of capability and
consistency in the IT infrastructures of emerging markets; and the existence of protectionist
policies to insulate domestic exchanges and financial services firms from external competi-
tion. The Aite Group also notes the importance of: the exorbitant costs of developing a local
presence in an Asia Pacific financial market, and the lack of a viable third‐party vendor
community to provide support for the development of high-capability HFT operations.
The Aite Group ((2011), p. 10) has further written that, “[d]espite these hurdles, the
globalization of financial markets will continue, as firms look to diversify their risk and
optimize their existing organizational and IT infrastructures.” So, although the penetra-
tion of HFT in the Asian financial markets has not been rapid or widespread, we never-
theless have offered an assessment of the drivers and barriers to the wider adoption
and diffusion of HFT in the region.
The roles of competition, cooperation, and regulation
We next will discuss competition and cooperation among different stakeholders in
HFT trading activities, as well as regulation at the country level.
Competition and Cooperation
The emergence of HFT has led to an arms race for speed among traders. In order to
outperform their competition, HFT firms must keep improving their capabilities in dif-
ferent ways. They have all invested significantly in low-latency technologies so that they
can trade faster than their competitors. Being faster by just several microseconds sup-
ports the identification of arbitrage opportunities, which will permit greater profitabil-
ity. In addition, they demand smarter trading algorithms that are updated and
Kauffman et al. Financial Innovation  (2015) 1:4 Page 10 of 27
upgraded constantly in order to stay ahead of competition, since trading algorithms are
vulnerable to reverse engineering by rival firms. High-frequency traders, thus, are look-
ing to recruit the best and brightest programmers from the world’s top universities, to
ensure that they can remain competitive in the market. In general, such competition
among high-frequency traders has a positive impact on the market. It serves to reduce
bid-offer spreads and transaction costs for all participants in the financial markets, in-
cluding institutional and individual clients. The competition among HFT firms with re-
spect to low-latency communications capabilities is related to their desire to become
involved in front-running, the practice of equity trading on behalf of the firm itself, and
not giving first priority to supporting trades by clients, who do not yet have access to
the same information.
Many researchers have studied the market transformation impacts of HFT competi-
tion. Most of them found positive effects. For example, Hendershott et al. (2011) uti-
lized a dataset of NYSE electronic message traffic to test the impact of algorithmic
trading on liquidity. They showed that algorithmic trading led to the narrowing of bid-
ask spreads, reduced adverse selection, accelerated trade-related price discovery, and
increased market liquidity. Hendershott & Riordan (2013) used data from the firms
listed on the Deutsche Boerse DAX, where algorithm trading supplied 50 % of the li-
quidity. They found the similar: algorithm trading increased the efficiency of the price
discovery process. More recently, Chaboud et al. (2014) studied the impact of algorith-
mic trading in the foreign exchange market using a long time series of high-frequency
data, and also found an improvement in the price efficiency after using algorithm tra-
ding, and fewer arbitrage opportunities for slower traders.
To support HFT practices, trading venues such as the stock exchanges have to overhaul
their existing infrastructures, set up new trading and pricing rules, and adapt to changing
market microstructures, which will enable them to compete for market share more aggres-
sively. In the U.S. over the last two decades, massive changes have been seen in the IT infra-
structure of financial markets. All the trading venues in U.S. have upgraded their IT
infrastructures to support microsecond-level activities in trading. They also are providing
co-location and proximity access solutions to meet HFT participants’ demand for low-
latency telecommunication services, in the fight fir pricing and information distribution to
support more investor participation (Aite Group 2011, Gomber et al. 2011).
Chlistalla (2011) has reported on an interesting new development involving the asymmet-
ric pricing of trades. Exchanges are able to price-discriminate among traders and their
orders, and in this way, discourage too much trading that reduces liquidity as investors sell
their shares, by charging them a higher fee. The distinction, according to the author, is
between liquidity-takers and liquidity- makers. The latter bring new demand to the market
to purchase shares, so that the heavy sales by the former do not dominate.
The enhancement of data availability and the modification of fees for trading have
also been occurring in Europe. The primary foundation for securities market regulation
is embodied in the European Union’s November 2007 Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID), which changed the regulatory regime involving securities transaction
reporting and data sharing (SWIFTRef 2015). Chlistalla (2011) have suggested that the
European exchanges changed their fee structures, making them more advantageous for
HFT participants. The obvious conclusion is that this will be beneficial for the markets,
so long as HFT practices are viewed liquidity-making rather than liquidity-taking.
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The financial markets in the Asia Pacific region are making gradual changes in their trad-
ing infrastructures and operating rules to become more HFT-friendly too. In January 2010,
to enhance its competitiveness, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) launched the Arrowhead
trading platform to improve its trading speed and security, as we noted elsewhere (Bershova
& Rakhlin 2013). Table 2 presents a brief description of some of the other new IT initiatives
within the major Asia Pacific financial markets (Gomber et al. 2011).
Cooperation and competition in HFT go together. To upgrade or rebuild an exchange
trading platform for fast order processing capability, cooperation among a group of
stakeholders, including the trading exchange, technology and infrastructure providers,
and third-party software providers, is required. The development of effective risk man-
agement practices are also needed to satisfy the safety and security needs HFT traders.
In many cases, high-frequency traders must actively collaborate with exchanges to
reach win-win cooperative outcomes. For example, in the race to zero latency, high-
frequency traders typically will make payments to the exchanges or the ECNs for the
access to two types of services: direct connections to trading data; and co-location
services that enable traders to place their servers in the same data center that hosts an
exchange’s or an ECN’s market data system (Rogow 2012). Direct connection services
give HFT participants earlier access to trading data than conventional investors, who
can only get their data through value-added services providers, such as the Consoli-
dated Tape Association (CTA) which is related to the NYSE. Co-location services per-
mit HFT traders to minimize the transmission time between their own trading servers
and the systems operated by exchanges, which exacerbates the speed advantage of
high-frequency traders. Such practices also have led to the accusation that HFT traders
have unfair advantage. Many observers believe that it should be left to regulators to de-
cide what is right to do (Shorter & Miller 2014).
The SEC should not roll back the technology clock or prohibit algorithmic trading, but
we are assessing the extent to which specific elements of the computer-driven trading
environment may be working against investors rather than for them. An area of
Table 2 New Technology Initiatives at Four Stock Exchanges
Exchange Initiative Launch Details Latency and Capacity
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
(TSE)
Arrowhead January 2011 Next-gen low-latency trading
platform, co-location service
Matching engine processing
speed of 5 milliseconds, 4.68
million orders/day
Australia
Stock
Exchange
(ASX)
ASX Trade December2010 Next-gen low-latency trading plat-
form; derivatives, cash mkts; NAS-
DAQ OMX Genium INET platform
Matching engine processing
speed of 300 microseconds,
100,000 orders/second
Hong Kong
Stock
Exchange
(HKEx)
Upgrade
AMS
December
2011
Plans to improve latency, capacity of
existing platform
Matching engine processing
speed of 9 milliseconds,
30,000 orders/second
Singapore
Stock
Exchange
(SGX)
Reach August 2011 Next-gen low-latency trading plat-
form; cash markets; NASDAQ OMX
Genium INET platform
Matching engine processing
speed of 90 microseconds, 1
million orders/second
Source. Aite Group (2011)
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particular focus is the use of aggressive, destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable
market conditions, when they could most seriously exacerbate price volatility.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Mary Jo White, June 2014, quoted
by Shorter & Miller (2014)
Meanwhile, some exchanges are seeking a way to get ahead of the competition through
cooperation. They express an interest to combine their resources and capabilities to in-
crease their global competitiveness. For years, NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Boerse have
been trying to merge, signaling that the financial markets are becoming more consolidated
than before. It is no longer enough for an exchange to focus only on its domestic market.
Instead, it should be open to possible opportunities outside the country or region, and to
expand its global influence. Many major financial markets in the Asia Pacific region have
already started the consolidation process. In 2013, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) merged
with Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE), making it the world’s third-largest exchange based
on the number of listed companies, for example. This demonstrates a willingness on the
part of the exchange to cooperate to perfect their market mechanisms and coverage.
Regulation
Regardless of the positive effects of HFT that offers, such as reduced spreads, higher li-
quidity, and faster price discovery, its negative side is mostly what has caught people’s
attention. Several notorious market failures and accidents in recent years all seem to be
related to HFT practices. They showed how much risk HFT can involve and how huge
the damage can be.
HFT heavily depends on the reliability of the trading algorithms that generate, route,
and execute orders. High-frequency traders thus must ensure that these algorithms
have been tested completely and thoroughly before they are deployed into the live sys-
tems of the financial markets. Any improperly-tested, or prematurely-released algo-
rithms may cause losses to both investors and the exchanges. Several examples
demonstrate the extent of the ever-present vulnerabilities.
In August 2012, the Knight Capital Group implemented a new liquidity testing soft-
ware routine into its trading system, which was running live on the NYSE. The system
started making bizarre trading decisions, quadrupling the price of one company, Wiz-
zard Software, as well as bidding-up the price of much larger entities, such as General
Electric. Within 45 minutes, the company lost USD 440 million (Perez 2013). After this
event and the weakening of Knight Capital’s capital base, it agreed to merge with an-
other algorithmic trading firm, Getco, which is the biggest HFT firm in the U.S. today
(Popper 2012a). This example emphasizes the importance of implementing precautions
to ensure their algorithms are not mistakenly used.
Another example is Everbright Securities in China. In 2013, state-owned brokerage
firm, Everbright Securities Co., sent more than 26,000 mistaken buy orders to the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE of RMB 23.4 billion (USD 3.82 billion), pushing its
benchmark index up 6 % in two minutes (Miller & Wildau 2013). This resulted in a
trading loss of approximately RMB 194 million (USD 31.7 million) (Sun 2013). In a
follow-up evaluative study, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) found
that there were significant flaws in Everbright’s information and risk management sys-
tems (China Daily 2013).
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The damage caused by HFT errors is not limited to specific trading firms themselves,
but also may involve stock exchanges and the stability of the related financial market.
On Friday, May 18, 2012, the social network giant, Facebook’s stock was issued on the
NASDAQ exchange. This was the most anticipated initial public offering (IPO) in its
history. However, technology problems with the opening made a mess of the IPO. It
attracted HFT traders, and very large order flows were expected, and before the IPO,
NASDAQ was confident in its ability to deal with the high volume of orders.
But when the deluge of orders to buy, sell and cancel trades came, NASDAQ's trad-
ing software began to fail under the strain. This resulted in a 30-minute delay on NAS-
DAQ’s side, and a 17-second blackout for all stock trading at the exchange, causing
further panic. Scrutiny of the problems immediately led to fines for the exchange
(Popper 2013) and accusations that HFT traders bore some responsibility too (Levine
2012). Problems persisted after opening, with many customer orders from institutional
and retail buyers unfilled for hours or never filled at all, while others ended up buying
more shares than they had intended (McLaughlin 2012, Strasburg and Bunge 2012).
This incredible gaffe, which some estimates say cost traders USD 100 million, eclipsed
NASDAQ's achievement in getting Facebook's initial IPO, the third largest IPO in U.S.
history. This incident has been estimated to have cost investors USD 100 million.
Another instance occurred on May 6, 2010, when U.S. financial markets were surprised
by what has been referred to ever since as the “Flash Crash” Within less than 30 minutes,
the main U.S. stock markets experienced the single largest price declines within a day,
with a decline of more than 5 % for many U.S.-based equity products. In addition, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), at its lowest point that day, fell by nearly 1,000
points, although it was followed by a rapid rebound (Patterson 2012). This brief period of
extreme intraday volatility demonstrated the weakness of the structure and stability of
U.S. financial markets, as well as the opportunities for volatility-focused HFT traders
(Creswell 2010). Although a subsequent investigation by the SEC cleared high-frequency
traders of directly having caused the Flash Crash, they were still blamed for exaggerating
market volatility, withdrawing liquidity for many U.S.-based equities (Lewis 2014).
Since the mid-2000s, the average trade size in the U.S. stock market had plummeted,
the markets had fragmented, and the gap in time between the public view of the mar-
kets and the view of high-frequency traders had widened. The rise of high-frequency
trading had been accompanied also by a rise in stock market volatility—over and
above the turmoil caused by the 2008 financial crisis. The price volatility within each
trading day in the U.S. stock market between 2010 and 2013 was nearly 40 percent higher
than the volatility between 2004 and 2006, for instance. There were days in 2011 in which
volatility was higher than in the most volatile days of the dot-com bubble.
Author Michael Lewis (2014, p. 59) in The Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt.
Although these different incidents have different causes, the effects were similar and some
common conclusions can be drawn. The presence of algorithmic trading and HFT in the fi-
nancial markets exacerbates the adverse impacts of trading-related mistakes. It may lead to
extremely higher market volatility and surprises about suddenly-diminished liquidity. This
raises concerns about the stability and health of the financial markets for regulators.
With the continuous and fast development of HFT, larger and larger shares of equity
trades were created in the U.S. financial markets, as we noted earlier. Also, there was
Kauffman et al. Financial Innovation  (2015) 1:4 Page 14 of 27
mounting evidence of disturbed market stability and caused significant financial losses due
to HFT-related errors. This led the regulators to increase their attention and effort to pro-
vide the exchanges and traders with guidance on HFT practices They also expressed con-
cerns about high-frequency traders extracting profit at the costs of traditional investors and
even manipulating the market. Some forms of misconduct by these traders have been re-
ported (Biais & Woolley 2011). For instance, high-frequency traders can generate a large
amount of orders within microseconds to exacerbate a trend. Other types of misconduct in-
clude: ping orders, which is using some orders to detect other hidden orders; and quote
stuffing, which is issuing a large number of orders to create uncertainty in the market. HFT
creates room for these kinds of market abuses, and its blazing speed and huge trade vol-
umes make their detection difficult for regulators (Nelson & Cox 2013).
In addition to supporting studies of HFT’s impact on financial markets, such as Brogaard
et al. (2014), Hendershott et al. (2011), Zhang (2010), and Jarrow and Protter (2012), regula-
tors have taken steps to increase their regulatory authority over HFT activities. Some of the
problems that arose in the mid-2000s led to regulatory hearings in the United States Senate
(2009) on dark pools, flash orders and HFT practices in 2009, and the discussions continued
into 2012 (Brooks 2012). Another example occurred after the Facebook IPO problem. This
led the SEC to call for a limit up-limit down mechanism at the exchanges to prevent trades
in individual securities from occurring outside of a specified price range so that market
volatility will be under better control (Pisani 2013). These regulatory actions put stricter re-
quirements on HFT practices, aiming to minimize the market disturbance when many fast
trading orders occur within a day. Similar regulatory actions have occurred in Europe as
well. For example, in September 2013, Italy became the first country to levy fees HFT trad-
ing to discourage its usage (Stafford 2013).
There is no doubt that regulations need to be properly used to guide and regulate
HFT behavior. The reality, however, is a little different: regulators in different countries
have not achieved a global consensus on what actually constitutes effective HFT regula-
tory oversight. We have observed different levels of HFT regulations across the world.
Financial markets in the European Union have the strictest ones, while the United
States and Canada are operating at similar levels. Other countries in the Asia Pacific re-
gion have tended to be less rigorous, so that HFT in some countries has been able to
grow with few constraints – although this is certainly not true for Hong Kong. In fact,
during our work on this research, we observed that many countries in Asia have set
regulations to make the trading environment more HFT-friendly, rather than limit its
usage. Although avoiding the negative impacts of HFT and maintaining the financial
market integrity in their respective jurisdictions should be always in the mind of regula-
tors, in Asian financial markets such as Japan, Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore,
regulators have been trying to boost HFT growth for enhancing liquidity, but only
within an acceptable “safety zone.”
We next discuss some of the HFT-related regulations that are present in several dif-
ferent Asia Pacific region countries.
Japan. As the leading venue for HFT in the Asia Pacific region, Japan has been work-
ing to create a positive regulatory and technology infrastructure environment to sup-
port HFT practices, so that it can attract capital and improve liquidity (Bell 2014). For
instance, in 2012, Japan announced to remove the so-called “5 % rule,” so that trading
volumes on its alternative trading venues no longer an upper limit (Himaras 2012).
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This action makes arbitrage easier, and the Japan financial markets became more at-
tractive to high-frequency traders as a result.
Singapore. This is another country where the regulatory environment is becoming fa-
vorable to high-frequency traders. In order to boost its trading volume and attract
more liquidity, the SGX has recently considered several regulatory changes to support
HFT activities to a greater extent. We noted such adjustments as offering rebates of
ownership transfer fees and liquidity provisions to HFT traders. The rationale behind
these moves is to attract larger trading flows so that it can enhance the exchange’s prof-
itability (Kazmi 2012, Lim 2013).
Australia. Australia’s financial markets have been relatively slow to embrace the
HFT. The country’s main financial regulator, Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC), has been keen to act as a macro-level guide and give the market a
more balanced approach to HFT. In a recent announcement, the authority released
eight new rules for participants on dark liquidity and HFT (Australian Securities and
Investments Commission 2013). For example, from November 2013 on, if any suspi-
cious activity is identified in a crossing system, ASIC requires that it must be reported.
The new rules provide more market transparency, diminish the likelihood of trading ir-
regularities, and cleaner market operations.
Hong Kong. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is the regulatory body
set up to regulate Hong Kong’s securities and futures markets. In an effort to ensure
the integrity of Hong Kong’s financial markets, the SFC decided to enhance its “Code
of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Com-
mission.” This applies to intermediaries and investment fund managers. To have a bet-
ter risk management and market control, the SFC also introduced new regulations
governing the use of trading algorithms since January 1, 2014 (Carnachan 2013). One
trading rule of the SFC, however, was quite surprising: the market participants, espe-
cially the sellers and buyers, must conduct due diligence checks on each other for the
use of electronic trading tools (Markets Media 2013). This rule was criticized though: it
may introduce an undesirable level of uncertainty into the market.
Research directions
The range of issues on the development, evolution, impact, and risk management re-
lated to HFT deserve closer scrutiny. In what follows, we will lay out a research agenda
that we hope will inspire future research in this area. The issues that we identified in-
clude: HFT technology enhancement, innovation, diffusion, and globalization; the im-
pact and market transformation power of HFT, as well as risk management and
mitigation in financial markets operations; and firm strategy and regulation that have
the potential to guide and reshape the financial markets in appropriate ways. See, for
example, Chakraborty (2012), who comments on appropriate regulation in this area.
Appendix: Table 5 provides an overview.
We begin by offering the first research direction:
 Research Direction 1 (HFT Technology Enhancement, Innovation, Diffusion,
and Globalization). There is a need to pursue new bases for enhancement and
innovation related to HFT technology, and also a need to understand its patterns of
diffusion and evolution in the financial markets. This will be a fruitful research
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direction when we consider the globalization of financial markets, so practical
lessons and experience, together with new theory-based technology diffusion models,
should be developed to provide wise guidance for future HFT functionality.
Technology improvement is a never-ending process. Even though HFT firms are able to
trade at about 98 % of the speed of light today, there are still incentives and room to improve
and achieve faster speeds. A tiny difference in speed, measured in milliseconds of advantage
in order execution, can bring potential benefits to the trader by millions of dollars. With
such a large monetary incentive, HFT traders are likely to keep investing to make marginal
improvements in speed, if profitability merits spending money to achieve better perform-
ance. In the future arms race, the physical speed associated with how fast an order can be
sent in or cancelled, and how close the trader’s server is located to the system, are not the
only things that will affect the competition. Technological advances have enabled other kinds
of innovative ideas in this race too. For example, the emergence and development of social
media, such as Facebook and Twitter, offer opportunities for fast information access to social
sentiment data (Brokaw 2012). This has the potential to be used by high-frequency traders
to automatically incorporate live news into their trading strategies, so they can leverage faster
information acquisition to make the appropriate decisions. Consequently, it may be also in-
teresting for researchers to examine the value of offering real-time data services to traders,
which in turn could enable new types of business models for financial services market data.
The business value of HFT innovations may take a while to be fully understood and
utilized effectively, but they will continue to come to the market. As a disruptive tech-
nology innovation, HFT has demonstrated the huge value it offers, but at the same
time, there also is great potential for damage to market quality, but this also will not
stop its diffusion. It will be beneficial for academic researchers to apply various technol-
ogy adoption and innovation diffusion models to analyze and forecast the evolutionary
pattern of HFT, thus giving HFT practitioners useful guidance. One path forward for
this kind of research is to look at HFT development in different regions. The U.S. and
European markets, in terms of their experience with HFT operations, have been ahead
of the Asia Pacific market. The more advanced markets have started to realize the posi-
tive and negative aspects of HFT activities, and have sought more balanced develop-
ment, and not just higher speed for HFT practices.
The Asian markets, on the other hand, are in a relatively early stage, in which most
of the effort has gone toward encouraging and fostering the adoption of HFT, and
where its benefits will arise. With the increasingly integrated financial markets and
globalization of national economies, the depth of experience and hard lessons from
earlier HFT practices in U.S. and Europe will be valuable to support rapid learning in
the Asian regional markets. This leads to our second research direction:
 Research Direction 2 (Market Impact and Transformation, and Risk Management
for HFT Operations). An important research direction to pursue involves developing
comprehensive methodologies, including theoretical models, empirical studies and
real-world case studies. These things will enable a thorough examination of how
HFT has transformed the financial markets. In particular, research should be
conducted to study risk management and risk mitigation issues to improve support
for HFT practices in trading operations.
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Existing research, especially the quantitative and empirical studies in Finance, have
mostly emphasized the positive impacts of HFT. They have shown the different ways
how HFT improves market quality by reducing bid-ask spreads, speeding up the price
discovery process, and enhancing liquidity (Hendershott et al. 2011, Hendershott &
Riordan 2013). They claim not to have identified a relationship between HFT use and
market volatility though (Chaboud et al. 2014). In addition, they report that the adverse
impacts of HFT practices seem to be limited to traditional traders, leading to percep-
tions that the market is no longer a fair playing field.
On the other hand, real-world case studies have reported significant negative influ-
ences from HFT. For example, the problems with the Facebook IPO of stock on
NASDAQ and the May 2010 Flash Crash created enormous chaos and economics
losses, diminishing public trust in the stability of American financial markets. Why has
there been such a big discrepancy between the conclusions from research and observa-
tions from practice? The time has come to re-think and examine the impact of HFT
from a broader perspective. Researchers must realize that the changes caused by HFT
are deeper than what is suggested by quantitative market quality measurements. They
need to go beyond conventional spreads and volatility measurements that have been
used in the Finance literature for a long time.
More importantly, HFT practices fundamentally influence and change how the mar-
ket mechanism operates. They change how traders acquire actionable information, im-
plement their trading strategies, and automatically submit and cancel orders. HFT also
affects how exchanges have been redeveloping the technical infrastructures of their
trading platforms, and exploring the adoption of different fees. The impacts of such
market mechanism changes cannot be fully captured by or understood in terms of
spread or liquidity measurements, though these measurements will reflect some of the
changes to some extent. Recognizing this is important, because it suggests that future
research needs to be conducted in a more comprehensive way from a broader perspec-
tive, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies.
Consequently, one natural research direction should involve risk management
and mitigation in the financial markets. There are different types of risk related to
the use of HFT approaches. First, there is operational risk coming from the
reliability of trading algorithms used by HFT firms. This kind of risk always natur-
ally exists for any kind of new technology: it can only be reduced but never elimi-
nated. The minimization of operational risk relies on high-frequency traders’
constant checking and testing of their algorithms, the use of appropriate risk man-
agement tools, and adoption of effective risk management strategies. In addition,
the improper behavior of high-frequency traders will result in human-centric risk.
The misconduct of traders, involving ping orders, quote stuffing and layering, for
example, disturbs the effective daily operations of financial markets and impairs
the ability of all of the market participants to benefit from trading. These kinds of
behavior and their prevention are of interest to psychology and behavioral science
researchers, as well as policy-makers.
Finally, HFT practices create systemic risk. HFT firms seem to compete among them-
selves and operate with limited diversity. In the race for speed, they tend to converge on
the application of relatively similar algorithms and adopt similar strategies, such as co-
location and data integration using social media. With such a large number of market
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participants all utilizing the same technologies and strategies, there is an obvious mechan-
ism for systemic risk to be created. Once one mistake occurs, traders will react in the
same way and respond by taking similar actions. This will amplify the negative conse-
quence of the mistake, especially in high stress situations. This occurred during the Flash
Crash happened. Many HFT firms simultaneously tried to withdraw from the market,
which caused illiquidity for the trade of various equities. How to control systemic risk and
prevent the crash of the whole financial market is a critically important topic, especially to
regulators. This prompts our third research direction:
 Research Direction 3 (Firm Strategy, Regulation, and Future Opportunities for
HFT). Huge first-mover advantage has existed for HFT firms, but such advantage
has been disappearing quickly in the presence of intense competition. HFT firms will
need to explore new marketplaces and look for fresh arbitrage opportunities globally.
In addition, how to make use of the power of regulation to guide an appropriate level of
HFTactivities in financial markets is of sentinel interest for effective government oversight.
Another research direction that we suggest is to analyze HFT practices using an eco-
system view, instead of as an isolated technological innovation. This requires a systematic
and integrated research perspective that includes all the participants in the financial
markets, including high-frequency traders, conventional traders, software algorithm
vendors, technology and platform infrastructure providers, stock exchanges, and regulators.
The reason for employing an ecosystem view is simple: since the use of HFT impacts all
market participants and the market itself as a whole, the actions, decisions, and strategies of
these participants will influence how HFT practices evolve over time.
For example, as we have discussed, competition among firms has been a major driver for
HFT development. High-frequency traders compete on the basis of speed and improved
trading strategies to achieve higher returns, the impetus for continuing technology
innovation in the financial markets. The winners in this arms race typically are those who
can trade faster than their competitors or who are using more advanced trading algorithms,
and processing the information that they receive in ways that are different from the market.
The high returns of the first-movers in HFT markets are not sustainable though, like
in ther financial services settings (Tufano 1989). With appropriate quantitative model-
ing and technical staff, who can be readily acquired in the labor market, competitors
can imitate the firms that are succeeding, and transform the technological advantages
of the leaders into market-wide competitive necessities. Intense competition has pushed
many HFT firms to go to great lengths to gain an edge. Their actions have included:
searching for and hiring top computer scientists to develop fast algorithms; trimming
fractions of seconds off trading times by physically moving their computer servers to
be co-located with the data processing facilities of the stock exchanges where they
trade. These things are very expensive for the HFT firms. As a result, the profits of
HFT firms are reported to have declined since the financial crisis of 2008 (Phillips
2013). First-mover advantage appears to have quickly diminished for HFT firms.
Beyond continuous technological innovation and efforts to compete in the financial
markets, another strategy for HFT firms may be to enter new financial markets where
arbitrage opportunities have not yet been fully explored. In recent years, HFT has been
growing around the world, but not all regions have demonstrated growth at the same
Kauffman et al. Financial Innovation  (2015) 1:4 Page 19 of 27
pace. The development of HFT in major Asian financial markets is still in its initial
stage, and some of the market environments are friendly and supportive relative to U.S.
and Europe markets, and are worthwhile for firms to patiently explore. Many Asian
countries welcome HFT practices because they believe such approaches to trading will
help to attract liquidity and support further development of local financial markets. In
addition, there are still some regions that have not experienced HFT trader entry to
any great extent. This includes the huge financial markets of China. Thus, we expect to
see more HFT firms starting to show an interest in the Asian Pacific region, as they
search for fresh opportunities.
Other important stakeholders in the HFT technology ecosystem are the regulators.
They have the power to set rules and laws to guide the development of HFT practices.
Their actions will directly or indirectly support or restrict the adoption and develop-
ment of HFT in different national economies. U.S. and E.U. policy-makers, it seems,
have been mostly taking a trial-and-error approach. They learn from errors and failures,
and then revise the existing regulations accordingly to solve the specific problems they
have seen. This process also involves repetition, with the hope that what will eventually
result will converge to the most appropriate set of financial regulations.
Some examples will help to illustrate this point. One occurred after the early emer-
gence of computerized trading and ECNs in late 1990s. The U.S. stock exchanges re-
vised their price quotation rules in 2001 to allow trade to be priced in decimals, which
encouraged algorithm trades via the ECNs. In the following several years from 2001 to
2012, algorithmic trading grew rapidly. This showed the regulatory concerns about the
over-heated growth of algorithmic trading activities. Following the chaos of NASDAQ’s
problems with Facebook’s IPO in May 2012 and Knight Capital’s failure in August
2012, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started to investigate the role of so-
cial media in securities fraud in November 2012 (Goldstein & Ablan 2012). The Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (2013) laid out new restrictions on the use of social
media behavior related to public company announcements in 2013. From these past
cases, we are able to observe the relationship between regulation and financial market
operations, and their mutual actions and reactions.
Financial market policy-makers in the Asia Pacific region have the advantage of making
use of the pioneering experiences of regulators in other parts of the world, so they do not
make the same mistake. This is the benefit of being a step slower than their counterparts in
the U.S. and Europe in terms of HFT development: they can use a learning-by-doing
process instead of a trial-and-error approach. In the future, they also will need to pay
attention to key issues such as risk management, trading algorithm reliability, platform
robustness, trading strategies and record tracking, and market transparency. They also need
to explore how to minimize perceptions about and the reality of unfair advantage for some
traders. When the speed advantage of HFT market participants puts the fairness and integ-
rity of the market at risk, investor confidence will erode, and in the long run, may result in
their reluctance to participate. These issues will be valuable to examine more closely.
Conclusion
High-frequency trading (HFT) capabilities represent a European and American
financial innovation that has developed and diffused rapidly around the world. Today,
HFT market participants generate nearly half of the trading activities in U.S. financial
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markets. As HFT firms from the U.S. and U.K. have expanded their global influence,
major financial markets in other regions have all been penetrated by HFT. The contin-
ental European Community countries are the most prominent adopters of HFT prac-
tices outside the U.S. and the U.K. now. The financial markets in European
Community have demonstrated a similar HFT adoption trend as in the American and
London markets, with about 25 % of equity trading volume attributed to HFT activities.
Compared with financial markets in U.S. and European Community, financial mar-
kets in the Asia Pacific region have been a little slower to buy into HFT adoption. How-
ever, the major Asian markets are all moving towards greater efficiency by exploring
how they can best employ more HFT. To support HFT practices, the exchanges in the
Asia Pacific region have to upgrade their trading infrastructures, set up new trading
and pricing rules, and enhance their capability to handle large volumes of trades very
fast. This will permit them to effectively compete for market share and establish greater
liquidity in their respective markets.
When all of the global markets have been penetrated by HFT practices, effective co-
operation among a group of key stakeholders, including the exchanges, technology
providers, third-party software vendors, and traders, is likely to be a pre-condition for
exchange operations around the world. Some examples are the TSE’s merger with OSE
in Japan and NYSE Euronext’s effort to merge with the Deutsche Boerse.
In this study in mid-2015, we did not find sufficient evidence to suggest that HFT
practices have created dramatic new and strong forces to transform the regional mar-
kets of the Asia Pacific region. In fact, we found that there has been a mixed response
to the implementation of HFT among financial markets here. Japan and Australia have
truly embraced HFT practices, by making the kinds of technology investments, and
adjusting trading regulations and fee structures that make their financial markets more
conducive to HFT activities than in the past. HFT traders are still few in number, and
not generating the aggregate volume and value of HFT trades in the Hong Kong and
Singapore stock exchanges, as can be observed elsewhere. This is mainly due to the
high transaction costs and lack of market fragmentation that might support arbitrage
for domestic equity trading in these two markets.
HFT is embraced in these financial markets. It serves to diminish the bid-ask spreads
and reduce transaction costs for all market participants. It also typically contributes to
higher market liquidity (though not all observers agree with this), and a faster price dis-
covery process. Despite these apparent benefits, the countervailing down-side impacts
have caught the attention of regulators, investors, media analysts, and academic
researchers. They have all observed and analyzed the market failures and trading
accidents that have occurred in recent years – all apparently having some ties to HFT
practices. These incidents have all been front-page news in the digital financial news-
papers of our time: the Flash Crash, the Facebook IPO, and Knight Capital’s software
glitch in the U.S., and the Everbright Securities episode in China. These accidents exposed
the weakness and vulnerability of current financial markets, suggesting that proper regula-
tions must be implemented to guide and limit the behavior of high-frequency traders.
Endnotes
1The journalist, Michael Lewis (2014), in his book The Flash Boys: A Wall Street Re-
volt, reported on the race to reduce the latency of sending buy and sell orders to the
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market through different means, including constructing a dedicated low-latency line to
create the “shortest and straightest” route from Chicago to New York. This was to re-
duce the round-trip communication time between these points from 13.10 milliseconds
to 12.98 milliseconds (Spread Networks 2012), creating fast network advantage, and
improving performance over a typical network that can deliver round-trip performance
in 14.5 milliseconds (Adler 2012).
2There are numerous sources of HFT value and market share data. In this article, we
will refrain from presenting data on estimated values for these facts, which will cause
some of the numbers that we report to not be as current as is sometimes seen in what
the press reports.
3An interesting footnote to the Flash Crash is that the investigation is continuing as of
April 2015 (Goodley 2015). A British trader operating from a suburban house in Hounslow,
West London, is alleged to have placed “multiple, simultaneous, large-volume sell orders
at different price points – a technique known as ‘layering’ … [this] created the appearance
of substantial supply in the market … When prices fell as a result of this activity, [the
trader] allegedly sold futures contracts only to buy them back at a lower price.”
Appendix
Table 3 Definitions of Key Terms and Concepts
Terms Definitions Comments
Algorithmic
Trading
Use of an electronic platform for entering
trading orders with an algorithm that
executes programmed trading instructions
based on timing, price and volume.
Used by buy-side traders, such as mutual
funds, pension funds and investment banks,
whose customers need sophisticated market
support services.
Alternative
Trading Systems
Non-exchange trading platforms that match
buy orders and sell orders.
Account for a lot of liquidity trading; Dark pools
and ECNs are alternative trading systems.
Bid-Ask Spread Difference between highest price a buyer is
willing to pay and lowest price a seller is
willing to sell an asset.
If the bid price is $40 and the ask price is
$41, then the bid-ask spread is $1.
Circuit Breaker Defensive approach used by exchanges to
limit damage induced by the sharply fall of a
security’s price.
Activated when a market index falls by a
predeter-mined amount in a period of time,
so trading stops.
Co-locationService High-frequency traders place trading
computers in data centers that house
exchange’s computer servers.
Made available by stock exchanges, which
charge fees for services offered, building new
revenues.
Dark Pool A private space for institutional investors to trade
away from the public exchanges, which enables
them to maintain secrecy about potentially large
lots of stick that are to be traded.
Trades that happen in dark pools are
concealed from the public. These occur due
to the fragmentation of the financial markets,
and because electronic trading enables them.
Decimalization System that requires the prices of securities
to be quoted in decimals rather than in a
fractional format.
Helps to narrow the bid-ask spread.
Electronic
Communication
Network
An ECN is an automated system to match
buy and sell orders for securities, typically
after an exchange’s regular operating hours.
Allows brokerages to trade directly with
individual investors without a middleman;
supports investors across different regions
Front-Running An illegal practice in which brokers trade for
their own account ahead of their customers,
based on the knowledge of the pending
orders from them.
When pending orders from customers are
predicted to influence the security price,
trading ahead of customers allows brokers to
obtain more profit.
Layering A strategy used by HFT brokerage firms that
enter and cancel orders that they never truly
intend to execute quickly.
Involves ask orders above the market price,
followed by bid orders that approach that
price by HFT firms; bids are canceled once
the higher price is reached. Recognized as
market manipulation.
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Table 3 Definitions of Key Terms and Concepts (Continued)
Liquidity Traders can buy / sell securities in market
without creating an impact on securities’
prices.
Liquidity implies low transaction cost, the
possibility of immediate trades, and deep
demand / supply.
Ping Orders Using small equity orders to detect other
hidden trade orders.
Used to detect hidden supply / demand in
dark pools.
Price Discovery The process of determining an equity’s price
in a financial market through interactions
between sellers and buyers.
The price discovery process is influenced by
many factors that affect market demand and
market supply.
Quote Stuffing Practice of HFT firms that enter and withdraw
orders quickly to increase market uncertainty
to create trading opportunities.
Larger players (market-makers), are able to
do this practice, because they have direct
links to stock exchanges.
Regulation NMS Regulations to promote the development of
a national market system in the U.S. for
equity trading.
Focused on immediate priority for inter-
market equity prices, fast access to quotes,
and minimum stock price increments. Similar
to MiFID rules in Europe.
Stamp Duty A tax levied on legal documents that are
filed when economic transactions occur.
Usually involve the ownership transfer of
assets or property for stocks, bonds and
other financial instruments.
T + 1 Regulation Stocks are not allowed to be sold on the day
when they are bought, but only the following
day – T + 1.
Adopted by stock exchanges in China.
Tick Size The minimum price increment for securities
price quotes.
Tick sizes can be fixed or flexible.
Volatility Used to measure dispersion or variance of a
security’s price.
Indicates uncertainty about changing prices
of a security.
Note. The sources of these definitions include the following: BATS Trading Ltd., Financial Times, Forbes, Inland
Revenue Authority of Singapore, Investopedia, Nanex, NASDAQ, New York Times, Reuters, Wall Street Journal, and
other authoritaive financial websites.
Table 4 Accelerators and Decelerators for HFT Adoption in the Asian Countries
Location Accelerating Factors Decelerating Factors
Japan Arrowhead launch at Tokyo Stock Exchange;
low transaction fees, with average cost of 18.34
basis points in 2010; high fragmentation level
for trading of equities; very small tick size;
favorable regulations (Yoon 2010).
None
Australia Trading infrastructure recently upgraded; co-
location services available; low trading fees at 15
basis points; Chi-X uses maker-taker pricing
model (Mishkin 2011).
Low fragmentation level with only three
exchanges in Australia’s market; and no
transaction rebates (Securities and Exchange
Commission 2010).
Hong
Kong
Automated Order Matching and Execution
System (AMS/4) upgraded in 2011 (Aite Group
2011).
High stamp duty of 0.1 % tax for ownership
transfer of equity shares; low fragmentation level
for individual equity grading; and an unfavourable
regulatory environment (Gov.HK 2013).
Singapore Launch of ultra-fast trading engine, SGX Reach;
co-location service; deployment of circuit breakers
and risk controls as new market safeguards; pro-
posed regulatory changes include offering rebates
for ownership transfer fees and provision of
liquidity to HFT traders (Malakian 2011).
High trading fees at 20 basis points; no market
fragmentation with just SGX; new rules to
regulate HFT operations in dark pools (Gov.HK
2013).
China Introduction of low-latency trading technology
(Grant 2012).
Unfavorable regulatory environment; high
network communication latency; T + 1
regulation; low-level IT support; high stamp duty
(Grant 2012).
South
Korea
South Korea seems to lack basic accelerators for
HFT trading to take hold and flourish (Kang 2012).
Implementation of a kill switch for trading (Song
& Grant 2013); little investment in sophisticated
trading technology and hardware infrastructure
(Kang 2012); fees for equity trading (Barnes 2013).
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Table 4 Accelerators and Decelerators for HFT Adoption in the Asian Countries (Continued)
India Launch of co-location service in 2010; direct
market access available; approval of smart order
routing in BSE; BSE reduced fees (The Trading
Mesh 2011b, NSE 2014).
Low matching engine speed; low fragmentation
level; NSE has high clearing and trading fees
(The Trading Mesh 2011b); sometimes lacking
liquidity in market to close out positions.
Indonesia Direct market access available (Valentine & Misra
2012).
Low fragmentation level with only one
exchange: Indonesia Stock Exchange.
Thailand Direct market access available; trading platform
technology upgraded; tick size reduced
(Valentine & Misra 2012).
Low fragmentation level with only two stock
exchanges: Stock Exchange of Thailand and
Market for Alternative Investment.
Malaysia Direct market access available; platform
technology upgraded; tick size reduced
(Valentine & Misra 2012).
Low fragmentation level, with only one
exchange; infrastructure is still too young for
HFT development (Lim 2014).
Philippines Platform technology upgraded; tick size reduced
(Valentine & Misra 2012); implmenention of
broker anonymity (Valentino 2014).
Low fragmentation level with only one
exchange: Philippine Stock Exchange.
New
Zealand
Favorable regulatory environment (Lynch 2013). Low trading volume; no co-location service
(Field 2014).
Table 5 Directions for Future Research
Research
Directions
Research Questions Theories and Approaches Potential Contributions
HFT technology
enhancement,
innovation,
diffusion and
globalization
• What is the business value
of advanced technology,
such as real-time data
services for traders?
Digital divide theory;
technology adoption and
diffusion theory; event
history methods for
adoption events; finite
mixture logit modeling.
Based on technology and
innovation adoption and
diffusion models, we can
analyse and forecast the
evolutionary patterns of HFT
in emerging markets, such as
Asian financial markets in
Asian, and give HFT
practitioners useful guidance
and help them avoid some
problems.
• What about HFT
innovations?
• What can Asian financial
markets learn from U.S. and
Europe?
Market impact,
transformation,
and risk manage-
ment for HFT
operations
• What’s the impact of HFT
on the underlying market
quality?
Microeconometrics and
empirical methods; natural
experiments; and matched
sample designs.
Researchers need to take a
broader perspective than
traditional bid-ask spread and
liquidity measurement, to
analyze the impact of HFT on
financial markets. Researchers
also should provide sugges-
tions on the control of risks in
the presence of HFT presence
and promote market stability.
• How are retail and
institutional investors
influenced by HFT use?
• Why do significant incidents,
such as the Flash Crash,
happen in financial markets
that employ HFT practices?
• How to manage and
mitigate risks, such as
operational risk and traders’
misconduct, in financial
markets with HFT present?
Firm strategy,
regulation, and
future opportunities
for HFT
• How will actions, decisions
and strategies of market
participants influence the
evolution of HFT?
Theories of firm
competition and strategy;
financial IS ecosystem
approach.
By studying financial markets
with HFT practices,
researchers can develop a
deeper understanding of
their impacts on different
kinds of stakeholders. Also,
the roles of regulators in
promoting market-wide
fairness and integrity need
to more fully understood.
• How do HFT regulations
differ around the world?
• What effects will they have
on HFT evolution?
• How can regulators ensure
the fairness and integrity of
financial markets with HFT
present?
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